is mandatory.
2 This is important, because a risk-sharing arrangement that is not legally enforced is only viable when there exists no ex-post incentive to quit the arrangement whenever a transfer has to be made. In a situation of underfunding of the pension fund, the young would be tempted to leave the system instead of guaranteeing the pensions of the retired through higher contributions. If the buffers become too large, the old will be tempted to close the fund. If participation in a funded pension system is voluntary, the ex-ante benefits of intergenerational risk sharing may be forgone.
In this chapter, the feasibility and welfare consequences of a funded pension system with voluntary participation and intergenerational risk sharing is expored. So far, there hardly exists any formal analysis addressing this issue. Such an analysis is of substantial policy relevance, because the countries that currently increase or plan to increase the funded component of their pension systems need to take informed decisions about its design. In particular they need to decide whether to introduce certain defined-benefit elements and whether to make participation obligatory.
Ongoing discussions or even reforms take place in many countries. Of particular relevance for this chapter is the discussion in the U. plans. Whether the revision will support or discourage moving towards funded secondpillar pensions in EU member states will depend to a large extent on the exact details of the proposal. In the Netherlands, pressure on mandatory pension fund participation has been growing. The current generosity of funded occupational pensions is unsustainable due to the ageing of the population, while the financial crisis has left many pension funds underfunded. Young generations see their contributions rise, while they are concerned that insufficient assets will remain in the pension funds to secure their own future pension benefits. Hence, their reluctance to participate in the system grows. Therefore, social partners, supported by the government, have been working on redesigning current pension contracts, which should preserve mandatory participation and the risk-sharing benefits that this brings to all generations involved.
Our analysis takes place in the context of a simple infinite horizon model with two overlapping generations. Voluntary participation is modelled through a participation constraint that requires the expected utility from participation to be at least as large as expected utility under autarky, which is defined as a situation without any form of pension system and, hence, without any risk sharing between generations. When the return on the pension fund portfolio is low, the current young make a transfer to the current retirees. Individuals always have the option to not participate after the current shock has materialised. Participation yields benefits in terms of intergenerational risk sharing. However, numerical results show that the ex-post option to not participate in the system renders a funded system unfeasible for low degrees of risk aversion and when portfolio returns have low variance. In those circumstances the risk-sharing benefits will be lost. Increases in risk aversion and uncertainty about the returns raise the likelihood of a sustainable funded system based on voluntary participation. However, risk sharing would still be less than under the optimal arrangement with obligatory participation. Raising risk-aversion and volatility further, we find that the optimal solutions under voluntary and obligatory participation coincide.
This chapter draws from several strands of the literature. First, there is a literature on intergenerational risk sharing in pension systems. Bohn (1999b Bohn ( , 2003 the option of joining the public insurance contract. Our setup differs from these other contributions in that our agents only live for two periods and transfers always go from the young to the old. The young are prepared to make such transfers because they expect the future young to also honour the risk-sharing arrangement.
The third strand of the literature to which this chapter is related is that on discontinuity risk in pension systems. The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2, the model is set up and solved for the autarky solution. Section 3 introduces a pension fund and solves for the optimal transfer rule in the absence of a participation constraint. In Section 4, we introduce the participation constraint and characterise the various equilibria. This section also solves for the optimal pension fund rule. Section 5 works out a numerical example. Finally, Section 6 concludes the main text of the chapter.
Model and autarky solution
We set up an infinite-horizon overlapping generations model. In each period, a new, young generation is born. The generation born in period t will be referred to as the "period-t generation". Each generation consists of identical individuals and lives for two periods. In the first period of its life, the generation works, consumes and saves for its old age. When old in the second period of its life, the generation is retired and consumes all of its savings. Savings can be invested in a single risky asset. We assume that subsequent returns on the asset are identically and independently distributed. All generations are of the same size, which we normalise to unity.
The preferences of an individual born in period t are given by: In the absence of any form of pension system, that is, under "autarky", consumption of the period-t generation in the two periods of its life is:
where w t is the exogenous wage rate, s t are private savings under autarky and r t+1 is the return on savings. The individual solves the intertemporal consumption allocation problem:
which implies the first-order condition:
Utility under autarky is given by:
where c a t,t and c a t+1,t are the optimal consumption levels under autarky.
Introduction of a pension fund
We introduce a pension system with a simple funding rule. This introduces the possibility of intergenerational risk sharing. A young person privately saves an amount s t and contributes an amount θ to the pension fund. The fund invests this contribution in financial assets and pays out the gross return as a pension benefit one period later. In addition, if the return on the fund's assets in period t is too low to provide a "decent" pension benefit, each individual of the period-t generation pays an additional re-funding contribution τ t , which is used to supplement the benefit to the current old generation. The transfer τ t is constrained to be non-negative.
Individuals
The consumption levels of a period-t generation member are:
The individual takes as given the known policy function set by the pension fund and now maximises (4.1) subject to (4.7) and (4.8). This implies the following first-order condition for his intertemporal consumption trade-off:
where c p t,t and c p t+1,t are the optimal consumption levels under participation in period t.
The pension fund
We assume that the pension fund applies the very simple funding rule given by:
(4.10)
We choose this rule, because it is appealing from a practical point of view, as it is intuitive and it would be easy to implement. It features two parameters to be set by the pension fund, r * and θ. In the remainder of the chapter, we assume that θ is given and that the pension fund uses r * as its policy instrument.
3 Figure 4 .1 shows the size of 3 An alternative would be to vary θ and keep r * fixed. The analysis is similar to the analysis presented here. Because the contribution rate is easier to observe and, hence, to calibrate we choose to vary r * . If we also allow for different values of θ, we get a two dimensional feasible region in r The transfer is rising in the short-fall of the actual market return from r * (i.e., as we move to the left along the horizontal axis in Figure 1 ). This dampens the sensitivity of the old's consumption to fluctuations in financial market returns when compared to the autarky situation (the dashed line).
The objective of the pension fund is to maximise from an ex-ante point of view the and θ and the optimal contract would be a combination of these two pension parameters for which welfare is maximised given that these parameters lie within this feasible region.
sum of the utilities of the current and all future generations:
where E 0 denotes the expectation taken at the start of period 1, before r 1 has materialised, and U p t ≡ u (c t,t ) + βu (c t+1,t ). Notice that the transfer is not a function of the savings of the previous young generation, but of the time-invariant pension fund rule parameters r * and θ. This implies that all young generations are affected in an identical way by the funding rule and in expectation the decisions of all young generations will be identical. Hence,
Using this, we can rewrite (4.11) as:
Aggregate welfare is maximised by setting r * such that the derivative of the objective function with respect to r * equals 0:
We call the value for r * implied by this first-order condition r * ,opt . Hence, r * ,opt yields the optimal transfer rule in the absence of a participation constraint.
The participation constraint
In the previous section we optimised welfare assuming that participation is mandatory.
In this section we relax this assumption. This gives rise to a participation constraint that needs to be fulfilled to sustain the collective pension scheme. We characterise the equilibria that arise in the presence of this constraint. Finally, it solves for the optimal value for r * under this participation constraint.
For any period t, we denote the set of possible realisations of the state of the world by R ≡ [−1, ∞). The particular state that actually materialises in period t is exhaustively described by the asset return r t in that period, with the continuously differentiable density function p (r t ) on R.
We define participation or lack of participation in the pension fund as:
Definition 1: A young generation in period t is said to participate in the pension fund if it chooses to follow the funding rule τ = τ (r t ) for the current realization r t . It does not participate if it does not follow this funding rule.
Before we continue the analysis we make the following assumptions for an arbitrary period t ≥ 1:
Assumption 1: All preceding young generations as of period 1 have participated in the pension fund. Each period-t young individual is free to choose whether or not to participate in the pension system after the state r t has materialised.
Assumption 2: If the period-t young decide not to participate, the economy shifts to autarky and remains in autarky forever after. Hence, none of the future young generations will ever participate.
In the remainder of this chapter we assume that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Using these assumptions we can write the participation constraint for the period-t young individual as: u c
Recursive formulation of the participation constraint
Since subsequent generations are identical, and assuming that the economy has not shifted to autarky in the past, the participation constraint for each state of the world is identical in any period. This means that we can drop the time subscripts and write (4.12) in terms of current and next-period variables (which are denoted by a prime) as:
where a prime denotes next-period variables.
Hence, in our OLG setting, there is a participation constraint analogous to that in the literature that deals with participation constraints in settings with two types of infinitely-lived agents, such as Thomas and Worrall (1988) and Kocherlakota (1996) .
However, because in our setting the old have no incentive to walk away from the contract, the pension fund does not need to ensure that it delivers at least the utility promised in the previous period. Instead, the fund should ensure that it does not violate the promised funding rule, so that the insurance it promises the current young for the next period remains credible. Otherwise, the economy falls into autarky (Assumption 2). In addition, in contrast to models with infinitely-lived agents in which transfers can go both ways, in our model transfers always go from young to old individuals. While they may have to make a transfer to the current old, the current young depend on the next period's young for their own insurance. That implies that we do not have a repeated game between agents who can punish each other when one of them deviates from the rule. Hence, the beliefs about the willingness of the next period's young to make a transfer are crucial for the current young's willingness to pay a transfer, as will become clear below.
The next period's young will decide not to participate if the transfer they have to pay is relatively large, i.e. if r <r , wherer denotes the threshold value for the next-period return r that makes next period's young indifferent between participating and not participating. Using Bayes' rule we obtain
for r <r p(r ) for r ≥r , so we can rewrite the participation constraint (4.13) as:
where the right-hand side is the utility to the young when the current return is r and the next period's cut-off return for participating isr .
Equilibrium definition
We explore equilibria that are defined as follows:
Definition 2: A recursive equilibrium with participation is an autarky savings decision s a , an autarky value U a , a pension funding rule {τ (r)}, a set of savings decisions under participation {s p (r)}, values under participation {U p (r,r )}, a current cut-off returñ r and expectations about the next period's cut-off returnr , such that 1. For any r, given the funding rule and expectations about future participation, the savings decisions {s p (r)} solve the young generation's optimization problem.
2. For r <r, U p (r,r ) < U a , while for r ≥r, U p (r,r ) ≥ U a .
3. The cut-off return for the current young,r, computed given the expectation about the future cut-off returnr , equals the cut-off return for the next period's young, r .
4. For at least one element r ∈ R, the funding rule sets τ (r) > 0 and has U p (r,r ) ≥ U a .
Solutions forr
The cut-off returnr depends on the size of the current transfer prescribed by the funding rule and the current belief about the cut-off return of the young in the next period. If r ≥ r * , the current young would certainly want to participate, so the cut-off return cannot exceed r * . Because subsequent young generations are identical in all respects under the assumption that all preceding young generations have participated in the pension fund, the cut-off return must be the same for every young generation that still has the option to participate. This implies thatr =r = (r ) = . . . .
An equilibrium solution forr requires that if the current young believe that the next young generation has the same threshold, then these current young want to participate if confronted with a return higher than this threshold and want to opt out if confronted with a lower return. That is,r is such that
Here, U p (r,r = r) is the utility from participation under the assumption that the next generation uses the current portfolio return as the cut-off return.
As the Appendix shows, the derivative of U p (r,r = r) with respect to r is the sum of a positive and a negative term and its sign is generally indeterminate. The negative term measures the utility cost of the extra transfer the current generation has to make this period. The positive term measures the benefit from extra insurance, because the future young have a higher threshold. This indeterminate derivative complicates our analysis. However, as the Appendix also shows, U p (r,r = r) is equal to U a and upward sloping in r = r * . That is, it approaches U a from below as r approaches r * . In the examples below, we will work with a constant relative risk aversion utility specification. Plots of the resulting function U p (r,r = r) show that it is always convex on r ∈ [−1, r * ]. Henceforth, we restrict ourselves to the case in which U p (r, r =r) is convex in r on this interval. Under this assumption, depending on whether U p (r,r = r)
is larger or smaller than U a at r = −1, there are three possibilities as illustrated by Figure 4 .2, which as a function of r plots the function ∆ p (r) ≡ U p (r,r = r) − U a :
This is the situation depicted by the lowest curve in Figure 4 .2. In this case,r = r * is the only threshold that is consistent with our equilibrium definition. This threshold implies that the pension fund collapses as soon as r < r * , so there can effectively be no risk sharing via a pension fund.
Situation 2: If ∆ p (r) = 0 at r = −1, then U p (r,r = r) < U a for all −1 < r < r * .
In this case, depicted by the middle curve in Figure 4 .2, equation (4.15) has exactly two solutions forr, namelyr = −1 andr = r * . This first solution implies that if the current young believe that the next period's young will participate in the pension system with certainty, then in the worst scenario today (i.e. r = −1), the current young are indifferent between participating and not participating. Hence, the pension system continues to exist forever.
Situation 3: If ∆ p (r) > 0 at r = −1, as depicted by the upper curve in Figure 4 .2, r = −1 is a corner solution, because under the belief that the next period's young will always participate the current young have higher utility from participating in the pension system than under autarky, even if they have to pay the highest possible transfer. Again,r = r * is also a solution. Finally, there exists a third solution −1 < r < r * , such that U p (r,r = r) = U a .
Properties of the solutions forr
We shall now further analyse Situation 3, because Situation 1 effectively excludes the possibility of risk sharing via a pension fund, while Situation 2 corresponds to a very specific parameter combination. In Situation 3, if the current young, given their belief that the next period's young will participate in every state (r = −1), are also willing to participate, there exist three solutions, namelyr = −1,r = r * and a solution −1 <r < r * . The first two solutions are stable, while the third is a knife-edge solution that will never be realised unless the current young start with an initial belief at exactly 
Initial belief lies between -1 and unstable solution
If the current young initially believe that the cut-off returnr of the next young generation lies between −1 andr u , then the economy will end up at the equilibrium with r = −1. We illustrate this case using Figure 4 .3, in which we plot the solid curve ∆ p (r) as a function of r and the dashed curves U p (r,r ) − U a for three different values (r 1 > r 2 > −1) ofr . Note that there exist an infinite number of such curves, one for each possible belief about next-period young's cut-off valuer . Since U a does not depend onr and the insurance value of participation is lower as the next generation's threshold is higher, U (r,r = r 1 ) < U (r,r = r 2 ) < U (r,r = −1) on the whole interval
Take an arbitrary starting value r 1 between −1 andr u forr and assume that the next generation uses the same threshold. This corresponds to point (A) in Figure 4 .3 where the lower dashed line crosses the solid line. This return r 1 cannot be the cut-off returnr of the current young since there are lower returns for which the current young are also willing to participate given their beliefs about the future's young generation's threshold. While keepingr fixed at r 1 , we decrease r, thereby raising the required transfer and reducing expected utility from participation U p (r,r = r 1 ) until we reach the value of r such that U p (r,r =r 1 ) = U a at r = r 2 in point (B). This defines the cutoff returnr 2 of the current young given their initial belief about future participation.
But,r 2 < r 1 , implying that the beliefr = r 1 cannot be an equilibrium belief, as in equilibrium the cut-off returns of all subsequent young generations must be identical.
Hence, the current young update their belief about the next young's cut-off return tõ r = r 2 < r 1 to make their threshold consistent with their own (point C). However, at r =r 2 , U p (r,r = r 2 ) again exceeds U a . Lowering r again, we move along the nextto-lowest dashed line to the left until we hit the vertical axis. This yields the cut-off returnr = −1 of the current young which implies that they will never want to opt out.
If opting out is never optimal for the current young, then it is also never optimal for future generations, so the threshold consistent with our equilibrium definition is the stable equilibriumr =r = −1.
Initial belief lies between unstable solution and r *
We illustrate this case using Figure 4 .4, in which we again plot the solid curve ∆ p (r)
as a function of r and the dashed curves U p (r,r ) − U a for three different values ofr .
As before, there exist an infinite number of these curves, one for each possible value of r . All these curves are upward sloping since the required transfer decreases and the insurance value stays constant along each line asr is constant. By definition the curve U p (r,r ) − U a crosses ∆ p (r) at r =r . Finally, these curves are positive (or zero) at r = r * since U p (r, r * ) − U a = 0 for r = r * and all curves withr < r * lie above this curve.
To show that every initial belief about the next generation's threshold betweenr u and r * results in the autarky solution r * start in point A in Figure 4 .4. At r = r 1 , we have U p (r,r = r 1 ) < U a so that the current young do not want to participate.
However, there are also higher returns r for which they do not want to participate, but according to their initial beliefr = r 1 the next generation does. So, r 1 cannot be the cut-off returnr of the current young. While keepingr fixed at r 1 , we raise r, thereby reducing the required transfer and raising expected utility from participation U p (r,r = r 1 ) until we reach the value of r such that U p (r,r = r 1 ) = U a in point B.
This defines the cut-off return r 2 of the current young given their initial belief about future participation. However, r 2 > r 1 , implying that the beliefr = r 1 cannot be an equilibrium belief, as in equilibrium the cut-off returns of all subsequent young generations must be identical. Hence, the current young update their belief about the next young's cut-off return tor = r 2 (point C). However, at r = r 2 =r , one has U p (r,r = r 2 ) < U a . Raising r, we move along the middle dashed line to the right until we hit the horizontal dashed line again. This yields the new cut-off return r = r 3 of the current young. Because r 3 exceeds the next generation's threshold r 2 , the latter cannot be an equilibrium cut-off return. We repeat the updating procedure until the current generation's cut-off and the beliefs about the next generation's cut-off converge to the stable equilibrium valuer =r = r * . 
Assumption about initial beliefs
The analysis thus far has shown that the only stable equilibrium can be one in which r =r = −1 orr =r = r * . The latter case is effectively ruled out by requirement (iv) of Definition 2 of an equilibrium. Hence, in the sequel we limit ourselves to the former case and we assume that each young generation starts with the belief that the next-period young will participate in all states of the world, i.er = −1. If, given this belief, the current young are prepared to participate for r = −1, i.e. when the transfer they have to make is at its largest, we have a sustainable pension fund that continues to operate in all periods under any state of the world. If for this initial belief the current young are unwilling to participate for r = −1, then, as the analysis in the previous subsection has shown, there exists no equilibrium with participation and the pension system breaks down.
Feasible pension fund rules
Until now we have fixed the contract at an arbitrary r * and varied the cut-off valuer for young generations. Next, we will vary r * to find the set of feasible funding rules by the pension fund. This part of the analysis closely follows the analysis by Ljunqvist and Sargent (2004, pp. 724-726) and Kocherlakota (1996) .
We evaluate U p for the worst state of the world (r = −1) under the assumption that the next period's young will participate irrespective of the next period's state of the world (i.e.,r = −1):
We can check for all possible values of r * whether the current young are indeed prepared to participate or not. Start with r * = −1. In this case, the young will never make a transfer, hence their consumption is constant across all states of the world and the pension fund effectively operates as an individual DC system. To see what happens when we increase r * , we differentiate U p (−1, −1) with respect to r * . Applying Leibniz' integral rule, this yields, is positive. In this case, we define r * ,max as the maximum value for r * for which a pension fund is sustainable and r * ,min as the largest value of r * < r * ,max for which ∆ p (−1) = 0.
However, there are also instances (as in Case C in Figure 4 .5) for which no such interval exists.
The optimal pension fund rule
We continue to focus on the stable equilibrium with participation in Situation 3 and assume that the funding rule is in place at the start of period 1. Writing out the terms in the pension fund objective function, equation (4.11), we obtain 
Substituting these terms into (4.11), it is straightforward to write the pension fund objective as:
If an interval r * ,min , r * ,max exists, we denote the value for r * ∈ r * ,min , r * ,max that maximises (4.17) subject to the participation constraint by r * ,pc .
A numerical example
In this section we work out a simple numerical example of the analysis we have pre- We assume that period utility is given by,
where parameter γ captures the constant degree of relative risk-aversion. The baseline values of the model parameters are set as follows. Consistent with standard calibrations in the macro-economic literature, we set γ = 5. Further, we assume that β = 0.5.
With one generation spanning 30 years, this corresponds to an annual discount factor of 0.977. The wage rate is simply a parameter that determines the scale of the economy and we fix it at w = 100. Given the wage rate w, we set θ = 10. Hence, this amounts to a realistic pension contribution rate of 10%. We assume that portfolio returns are lognormally distributed and independent over time. In setting the parameters for the portfolio returns, we make use of Campbell et al. (2003) (see Appendix). Specifically, the average annual portfolio return is set at µ = 0.089, which over a period of thirty years translates into an average return of 2.14. The standard deviation of the annual equity return in Campbell et al. (2003) is σ = 0.182, which implies a standard deviation of 0.91 over a thirty-year period. We will consider a wide range of standard deviations that comfortably covers this value. Given that the degree of risk aversion is somewhat on the high side, the conditions for a recursive equilibrium with participation are relatively favourable.
First, we solve for r * ,opt , the optimal choice of the pension fund for r * in the absence of participation constraints. Subsequently, we solve the autarky problem, which yields expected utility U a . Given U a , we can then solve for the minimum and maximum values r * ,min and r * ,max of r * for which our stable equilibrium in the presence of participation constraints still exists as well as the optimum value r * ,pc for r * in the interval r * ,min , r and Ω for the current young and all future generations. These ex-ante welfare gains are defined as follows:
We report the results in Table 4 .1 for different values of the risk aversion parameter γ, the annual standard deviation of the portfolio return σ and the pension contribution θ. The results show that the higher is the degree of relative risk aversion and the higher is the standard deviation of the asset returns, the more likely it becomes that participation in the pension fund is beneficial because of the risk-sharing gains that it provides.
Consider first the case when the pension contribution is at its baseline of θ = 10.
Then, for a relatively low degree of risk aversion γ = 3 the pension fund is viable for high volatilities of 0.25 and larger, while for a relatively high degree of risk aversion γ = 7.5 it is viable already for a moderate volatility of 0.15. For a given degree of risk aversion, the benefit from future risk sharing and thus the attractiveness of participation increases with the uncertainty about the future asset returns. Vice versa, for a given variance of the asset returns, future risk sharing and thus participation becomes more attractive when risk aversion rises. For γ = 7.5, when σ = 0.20 or larger, the young are even prepared to make a transfer that is larger than under the optimum without the participation constraint, i.e. r * ,max > r * ,opt . In this case, the participation constraint is not binding at the unconstrained optimum and, hence, the constrained optimum coincides with the unconstrained optimum, i.e. r * ,pc = r * ,opt > r * ,min . For γ = 3 the pension fund is viable for σ = 0.25 and for γ = 5 it is viable for σ = 0.20, although in these cases it produces less risk sharing than under the unconstrained optimum. In this case, r * ,pc = r * ,max < r * ,opt .
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In Table 4 .1 we also vary the size of the pension contribution. If θ = 20, then for two risk aversion -volatility combinations, (γ = 3, σ = 0.25) and (γ = 7.5, σ = 0.15), the participation constraint now prohibits any risk sharing, while it did not do so before when θ = 10. We also see that whenever there is voluntary participation under θ = 20, the values for r * ,max and r * ,pc have dropped relative to the corresponding ones under θ = 10, hence the scope for risk sharing has become smaller. The intuition for this is the following. With a transfer by the current young of the format (r * − r t ) θ, an increase in θ implies a larger transfer for given r t < r * and, hence, to avoid violation of the participation constraint for given future transfers, r * ,max needs to fall. However, this reduces the number of states in the future for which the current young will receive a transfer back and, hence, the insurance value of the pension falls. For some parameter combinations under consideration the insurance value falls so much that participation by the young is no longer beneficial to them. A reduction in θ from θ = 10 to θ = 5 yields the opposite effects and the scope for risk sharing increases.
The degree to which the participation constraint is binding is reflected in the welfare gain associated with participation. If voluntary participation is not optimal then, obviously, there can be no welfare gain, while once participation has become beneficial, further increases in risk aversion and the variability of the returns raise the welfare gains from participation. The welfare gain of the initial old is always higher than that of all subsequent generations, because they reap the benefits from the potential transfer, without ever having to pay a transfer themselves.
We also vary the discount factor. A higher discount factor corresponds to a lower time preference rate, implying that future events become relatively more important.
Hence, voluntary participation becomes more attractive to the young. After all, any benefit of participation in the form of a transfer only materialises in the future. This 4 We have also done a more elaborate numerical analysis in which we varied σ by small steps of 0.02 and extended the range beyond the one reported in the Table 4 .1. In all instances the results were qualitatively identical to those reported here, while for volatilities larger than 0.3 we always find that r * ,pc and r * ,opt are equal. These results are available upon request. is borne out by the results in Table 4 .2, in which we vary the discount factor and, for convenience, repeat the middle panel with β = 0.5. Discount factors of β = 0.3 and β = 0.7 correspond to annual time preference rates of roughly 4% and 1%, respectively.
In all instances in which the participation constraint is binding, we see that a higher discount factor raises r * ,pc and r * ,max . The qualitative effects of an increase in risk aversion or in the standard deviation of the portfolio return that we described earlier are confirmed for different values of the discount factor β. So far, the benchmark level of riskiness of the pension and individual investment portfolios was based on the implicit assumption of a 100% stake in equity. We will now make the implicit assumption that both the individual and the pension portfolio are invested half in equity and half in a risk-free asset. This implies that both the standard deviation and expected value of the overall portfolio return fall. The reason why we consider this case is that pension funds often invest in a mixture of risk-free assets and risk-bearing assets (mostly equity) and that we want to see what is the scope for risk sharing under voluntary participation in this case. The 50-50 division between the two categories is quite realistic for pension funds in the Netherlands. Obviously, the optimal individual savings rate in our model takes account of the new situation.
Following Campbell et al. (2003), we calibrate the risk-free rate at 2.1% per year (see Appendix). Table 4 .3 reports the numerical outcomes, where r * ,opt , r * ,max and r * ,pc all refer to returns on the total portfolio. For relatively low aversion (γ = 3), participation under the constraint is only attractive when the volatility of the equity returns is at its highest value σ = 0.3. Again, for higher degrees of risk aversion participation can be attractive at lower levels of volatility. Hence, for relatively high risk aversion and medium and high equity volatility, the pension fund is still viable under voluntary participation, although, not surprisingly, the welfare gains relative to autarky have dropped due to the reduced risk-sharing benefits that the fund provides. Table 4 .3: Results for 50% invested in risk free and 50% in equity 
Conclusion
In this chapter we have explored the feasibility and welfare consequences of a funded pension system with voluntary participation and intergenerational risk sharing. Our numerical results showed that the ex-post option to not participate obviates the existence of such a system when both risk aversion and financial market uncertainty are relatively low. Under those circumstances mandatory participation in the system is needed to reap the benefits of intergenerational risk sharing. Increases in these parameters raise the benefits from risk sharing and make the existence of an equilibrium with voluntary participation more likely. For intermediate values of these parameters, risk sharing would still be less than under the optimal arrangement with obligatory participation. However, raising risk-aversion and volatility further, the optimal solutions under voluntary and obligatory participation coincide.
Many countries that are currently trying to expand the funded pillar of their pension system need to decide on its design. In particular, will it be a defined-contribution system or will it contain certain defined-benefit elements that allow for intergenerational risk sharing? In the latter case, the question whether participation is obligatory becomes important. Giving individuals too much freedom in deciding whether to participate or not may lead to a breakdown of the system and, hence, to a loss of the risk-sharing benefits. The Dutch funded pillar has long and successfully operated under mandatory participation by the employees and employers and by collectively sharing risks among all the fund participants. However, the recent shrinkage of the pension buffers has undermined the confidence in the system, especially among the younger participants. Once large groups start losing their confidence in the system, the pressure to abolish mandatory fund participation will intensify. To prevent a collapse of the system and a loss of the benefits from intergenerational risk sharing, it is important that its planned overhaul leaves young participants with sufficient guarantee that they will also receive a benefit when they are old.
